What Does Putin Want?
By Rostislav Ishchenko
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Foreword by the Saker:
The analysis below is, by
far, the best I have seen since the beginning of the conflict in the
Ukraine. I have regularly posted analyses by Ishchenko on this blog
before, because I considered him as one of the best analysts in Russia.
This time, however, Ishchenko has truly produced a masterpiece: a
comprehensive analysis of the geostrategic position of Russia and a clear
and, I believe, absolutely accurate analysis of the entire “Putin strategy”
for the Ukraine. I have always said that this conflict is not about the
Ukraine but about the future of the planet
and that there is no “Novorussian” or even “Ukrainian” solution, but that the
only possible outcome is a strategic victory of either Russia or the USA which
will affect the entire planet. Ishchenko does a superb overview of the
risks and options for both sides and offers the first comprehensive “key” to
the apparently incomprehensible behavior of Russia in this
conflict. Finally, Ishchenko also fully understands the complex and
subtle dynamics inside Russian society. When he writes “Russian power
is authoritative, rather than authoritarian” he is spot on, and explains more
in seven words than what you would get by reading the billions of useless
words written by so-called “experts” trying to describe the Russian reality.
We all owe a huge debt of
gratitude to Denis, Gideon and Robin for translating this seminal text, which
was very difficult to translate. The only reason why we can read
it in such a good English is because the innumerable hours spent by these
volunteers to produce the high quality translation this analysis deserves.
I strongly recommend that
you all read this text very carefully. Twice. It is well worth
it.
The Saker
Translated from the Russian by Denis, Gideon,
and Robin
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What Does Putin Want?
By Rostislav Ishchenko
April 22, 2015 "Information Clearing
House" - It’s gratifying that “patriots” did not instantly
blame Putin for the failure to achieve a full-scale rout of Ukrainian troops in
Donbass in January and February, or for Moscow’s consultations with Merkel and
Hollande.
Even so, they still are still
impatient for a victory. The most radical are convinced that Putin will
“surrender Novorossiya” just the same. And the moderates are afraid that he
will as soon as the next truce is signed (if that happens) out of the need to
regroup and replenish Novorossiya’s army (which actually could have been done
without disengagement from military operations), to come to terms with the new
circumstances on the international front, and to get ready for new diplomatic
battles.
In fact, despite all the
attention that political and/or military dilettantes (the Talleyrands and the
Bonapartes of the Internet) are paying to the situation in Donbass and the
Ukraine in general, it is only one point on a global front: the outcome of the
war is being decided not at the Donetsk airport or in the hills outside
Debaltsevo, but at offices on Staraya Square1 and Smolenskaya Square,2 at offices in Paris, Brussels and
Berlin. Because military action is only one of the many components of the
political quarrel.
It is the harshest and the final
component, which carries great risk, but the matter doesn’t start with war and
it doesn’t end with war. War is only an intermediate step signifying the
impossibility of compromise. Its purpose is to create new conditions whereby
compromise is possible or to show that there is no longer any need for it, with
the disappearance of one side of the conflict. When it is time for compromise,
when the fighting is over and the troops go back to their barracks and the
generals begin writing their memoirs and preparing for the next war, that is
when the real outcome of the confrontation is determined by politicians and
diplomats at the negotiating table.
Political decisions are not often
understood by the general population or the military. For example, during the
Austro-Prussian war of 1866, Prussian chancellor Otto Von Bismarck (later
chancellor of the German Empire) disregarded the persistent requests of King
Wilhelm I (the future
German Emperor) and the demands of the Prussian generals to take Vienna, and he
was absolutely correct to do so. In that way he accelerated peace on Prussia’s
terms and also ensured that Austro-Hungary forever (well, until its
dismemberment in 1918) became a junior partner for Prussia and later the German
Empire.
To understand how, when and on
what conditions military activity can end, we need to know what the politicians
want and how they see the conditions of the postwar compromise. Then it will
become clear why military action turned into a low-intensity civil war with
occasional truces, not only in the Ukraine but also in Syria.
Obviously, the views of Kiev
politicians are of no interest to us because they don’t decide anything. The
fact that outsiders govern the Ukraine is no longer concealed. It doesn’t
matter whether the cabinet ministers are Estonian or Georgian; they are
Americans just the same. It would also be a big mistake to take an interest in
how the leaders of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Lugansk People’s
Republic (LNR) see the future. The republics exist only with Russian support,
and as long as Russia supports them, Russia’s interests have to be protected,
even from independent decisions and initiatives. There is too much at stake to
allow [Alexander] Zakharchenko or [Igor] Plotnitzky, or anyone else for that
matter, to make independent decisions.
Nor are we interested in the
European Union’s position. Much depended on the EU until the summer of last
year, when the war could have been prevented or stopped at the outset. A tough,
principled antiwar stance by the EU was needed. It could have blocked U.S.
initiatives to start the war and would have turned the EU into a significant
independent geopolitical player. The EU passed on that opportunity and instead
behaved like a faithful vassal of the United States.
As a result, Europe stands on the
brink of frightful internal upheaval. In the coming years, it has every chance
of suffering the same fate as the Ukraine, only with a great roar, great
bloodshed and less chance that in the near future things will settle down – in
other words, that someone will show up and put things in order.
In fact, today the EU can choose
whether to remain a tool of the United States or to move closer to Russia.
Depending on its choice, Europe can get off with a slight scare, such as a
breakup of parts of its periphery and possible fragmentation of some countries,
or it could collapse completely. Judging by the European elites’ reluctance to
break openly with the United States, collapse is almost inevitable.
What should interest us is the
opinions of the two main players that determine the configuration of the
geopolitical front and in fact are fighting for victory in the new generation
of war – the network-centric Third World War. These players are the United
States and Russia.
The U.S. position is clear and
transparent. In the second half of the 1990s, Washington missed its only
opportunity to reform the Cold War economy without any obstacles and thereby
avoid the looming crisis in a system whose development is limited by the finite
nature of planet Earth and its resources, including human ones, which conflicts
with the need to endlessly print dollars.
After that, the United States
could prolong the death throes of the system only by plundering the rest of the
world. At first, it went after Third World countries. Then it went for
potential competitors. Then for allies and even close friends. Such plundering
could continue only as long as the United States remained the world’s
undisputed hegemon.
Thus when Russia asserted its
right to make independent political decisions – decisions of not global but
regional import – , a clash with the United States became inevitable. This
clash cannot end in a compromise peace.
For the United States, a
compromise with Russia would mean a voluntary renunciation of its hegemony,
leading to a quick, systemic catastrophe – not only a political and economic
crisis but also a paralysis of state institutions and the inability of the
government to function. In other words, its inevitable disintegration.
But if the United States wins,
then it is Russia that will experience systemic catastrophe. After a certain
type of “rebellion,” Russia’s ruling classes would be punished with asset
liquidation and confiscation as well as imprisonment. The state would be
fragmented, substantial territories would be annexed, and the country’s
military might would be destroyed.
So the war will last until one
side wins.
Any interim agreement should be viewed only as a temporary truce – a needed
respite to regroup, to mobilize new resources and to find (i.e., to poach)
additional allies.
To complete the picture of the
situation, we only need Russia’s position. It is essential to understand what
the Russian leadership wants to achieve, particularly the president, Vladimir
Putin. We are talking about the key role that Putin plays in the organization
of the Russian power structure. This system is not authoritarian, as many
assert, but rather authoritative – meaning it is based not on legislative
consolidation of autocracy but on the authority of the person who created the
system and, as the head of it, makes it work effectively.
During Putin’s 15 years in power,
despite the difficult internal and external situation, he has tried to maximize
the role of the government, the legislative assembly, and even the local
authorities. These are entirely logical steps that should have given the system
completeness, stability, and continuity. Because no politician can rule
forever, political continuity, regardless of who comes to power, is the key to
a stable system.
Unfortunately, fully autonomous
control, namely the ability to function without the president’s oversight,
hasn’t been achieved. Putin remains the key component of the system because the
people put their trust in him personally. They have far less trust in the
system, as represented by public authorities and individual agencies.
Thus Putin’s opinions and
political plans become the decisive factor in areas such as Russia’s foreign
policy. If the phrase “without Putin, there is no Russia” is an exaggeration,
then the phrase “what Putin wants, Russia also wants” reflects the situation
quite accurately in my opinion.
First, let’s note that the man
who for 15 years has carefully guided Russia to its revival has done so in
conditions of U.S. hegemony in world politics along with significant
opportunities for Washington to influence Russia’s internal politics. He had to
understand the nature of the fight and his opponent. Otherwise, he wouldn’t
have lasted so long.
The level of confrontation that
Russia allowed itself to get into with the United States grew very slowly and
up to a certain point went unnoticed. For example, Russia did not react at all
to the first attempt at a color revolution in the Ukraine in 2000-2002 (the
Gongadze case,3 the Cassette Scandal,4 and the Ukraine without Kuchma
protest5).
Russia took an opposing position
but did not actively intervene in the coups that took place from November 2003
to January 2004 in Georgia and from November 2004 to January 2005 in the
Ukraine. In 2008, in Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia used its troops against
Georgia, a U.S. ally. In 2012, in Syria, the Russian fleet demonstrated its
readiness to confront the United States and its NATO allies.
In 2013, Russia began taking
economic measures against [Victor] Yanukovych’s regime, which contributed to
his realization of the harmfulness of signing an association agreement [with
the EU].
Moscow could not have saved the
Ukraine from the coup because of the baseness, cowardice, and stupidity of the
Ukraine’s leaders – not only Yanukovych but all of them without exception.
After the armed coup in Kiev in February 2014, Russia entered into open
confrontation with Washington. Before that, the conflicts were interspersed
with improved relations, but at the beginning of 2014 relations between Russia
and the United States deteriorated swiftly and almost immediately reached the
point where war would have been declared automatically in the prenuclear era.
Thus at any given time Putin
engaged in precisely the level of confrontation with the United States that
Russia could handle. If Russia isn’t limiting the level of confrontation now,
it means Putin believes that, in the war of sanctions, the war of nerves, the
information war, the civil war in the Ukraine, and the economic war, Russia can
win.
This is the first important
conclusion about what Putin wants and what he expects. He expects to win.
And considering that he takes a meticulous approach and strives to anticipate
any surprises, you can be sure that when the decision was made not to back down
under pressure from the United States, but to respond, the Russian leadership
had a double, if not a triple, guarantee of victory.
I would like to point out that
the decision to enter into a conflict with Washington was not made in 2014, nor
was it made in 2013. The war of August 8, 2008, was a challenge that the United
States could not leave unpunished. After that, every further stage of the
confrontation only raised the stakes. From 2008 to 2010, the United States’
capability – not just military or economic but its overall capability – has
declined, whereas Russia’s has improved significantly. So the main objective
was to raise the stakes slowly rather than in explosive fashion. In other
words, an open confrontation in which all pretences are dropped and everyone
understands that a war is going on had to be delayed as long as possible. But
it would have been even better to avoid it altogether.
With every passing year, the
United States became weaker while Russia became stronger. This process was
natural and impossible to arrest, and we could have projected with a high
degree of certainty that by 2020 to 2025, without any confrontation, the period
of U.S. hegemony would have ended, and the United States would then be best
advised to think about not how to rule the world, but how to stave off its own
precipitous internal decline.
Thus Putin’s second desire is
clear: to keep the peace or the appearance of peace as long as possible. Peace
is advantageous for Russia because in conditions of peace, without enormous
expense, it obtains the same political result but in a much better geopolitical
situation. That is why Russia continually extends the olive branch. Just as the
Kiev junta will collapse in conditions of peace in Donbass, in conditions of
world peace, the military-industrial complex and the global financial
system created by the United States are doomed to self-destruct. In this way,
Russia’s actions are aptly described by Sun Tzu’s maxim “The greatest
victory is that which requires no battle.”
It is clear that Washington is
not run by idiots, no matter what is said on Russian talk shows or written on
blogs. The United States understands precisely the situation it is in.
Moreover, they also understand that Russia has no plans to destroy them and is
really prepared to cooperate as an equal. Even so, because of the political and
socioeconomic situation in the United States, such cooperation is not
acceptable to them. An economic collapse and a social explosion are likely to
occur before Washington (even with the support of Moscow and Beijing) has time
to introduce the necessary reforms, especially when we consider that the EU
will have to undergo reform at the same time. Moreover, the political elite who
have emerged in the United States in the past 25 years have become accustomed
to their status as the owners of the world. They sincerely don’t understand how
anyone can challenge them.
For the ruling elite in the
United States (not so much the business class but the government bureaucracy),
to go from being a country that decides of the fate of inferior peoples to one
that negotiates with them on an equal footing is intolerable. It is probably
tantamount to offering Gladstone or Disraeli the post of prime minister of the
Zulu Kingdom under Cetshwayo kaMpande. And so, unlike Russia, which needs peace
to develop, the United States regards war as vital.
In principle, any war is a
struggle for resources. Typically, the winner is the one that has more
resources and can ultimately mobilize more troops and build more tanks, ships,
and planes. Even so, sometimes those who are strategically disadvantaged can
turn the situation around with a tactical victory on the battlefield. Examples
include the wars of Alexander the Great and Frederick the Great, as well as
Hitler’s campaign of 1939-1940.
Nuclear powers cannot confront
each other directly. Therefore, their resource base is of paramount importance.
That is exactly why Russia and the United States have been in a desperate
competition for allies over the past year. Russia has won this competition. The
United States can count only the EU, Canada, Australia, and Japan as allies
(and not always unconditionally so), but Russia has managed to mobilize support
from the BRICS, to gain a firm foothold in Latin America, and to begin
displacing the United States in Asia and North Africa.
Of course, it’s not patently
obvious, but if we consider the results of votes at the UN, assuming that a
lack of official support for the United States means dissent and thus support
for Russia, it turns out that the countries aligned
with Russia together control about 60% of the world’s GDP, have more than
two-thirds of its population, and cover more than three-quarters of its
surface. Thus Russia has been able to mobilize more resources.
In this regard, the United States
had two tactical options. The first seemed to have great potential and was
employed by it from the early days of the Ukrainian crisis.
It was an attempt to force Russia
to choose between a bad situation and an even worse one. Russia would be
compelled to accept a Nazi state on its borders and therefore a dramatic loss
of international authority and of the trust and support of its allies, and
after a short time would become vulnerable to internal and external pro-U.S.
forces, with no chance of survival. Or else it could send its army into the
Ukraine, sweep out the junta before it got organized, and restore the
legitimate government of Yanukovych. That, however, would have brought an
accusation of aggression against an independent state and of suppression of the
people’s revolution. Such a situation would have resulted in a high degree of
disapproval on the part of Ukrainians and the need to constantly expend
significant military, political, economic, and diplomatic resources to maintain
a puppet regime in Kiev, because no other government would have been possible
under such conditions.
Russia avoided that dilemma.
There was no direct invasion. It is Donbass that is fighting Kiev. It is the
Americans who have to devote scarce resources to the doomed puppet regime in
Kiev, while Russia can remain on the sidelines making peace proposals.
So now the United States is
employing the second option. It’s as old as the hills. That which cannot be
held, and will be taken by the enemy, must be damaged as much as possible so
that the enemy’s victory is more costly than defeat, as all its resources are
used to reconstruct the destroyed territory. The United States has therefore
ceased to assist the Ukraine with anything more than political rhetoric while
encouraging Kiev to spread civil war throughout the country.
The Ukrainian land must burn, not
only in Donetsk and Lugansk but also in Kiev and Lvov. The task is simple: to
destroy the social infrastructure as much as possible and to leave the
population at the very edge of survival. Then the population of the Ukraine
will consist of millions of starving, desperate and heavily armed people who
will kill one another for food. The only way to stop this bloodbath would be
massive international military intervention in the Ukraine (the militia on its
own will not be sufficient) and massive injections of funds
to feed the population and to reconstruct the economy until the Ukraine can
begin to feed itself.
It is clear that all these costs
would fall on Russia. Putin correctly believes that not only the budget, but
also public resources in general, including the military, would in this case be
overstretched and possibly insufficient. Therefore, the objective is not to
allow the Ukraine to explode before the militia can bring the situation under
control. It is crucial to minimize casualties and destruction and to salvage as
much of the economy as possible and the infrastructure of the large cities so
that the population somehow survives and then the Ukrainians themselves will
take care of the Nazi thugs.
At this point an ally appears for
Putin in the form of the EU. Because the United States always tried to use
European resources in its struggle with Russia, the EU, which was already
weakened, reaches the point of exhaustion and has to deal with its own long-festering problems.
If Europe now has on its eastern
border a completely destroyed Ukraine, from which millions of armed people will
flee not only to Russia but also to the EU, taking with them delightful
pastimes such as drug trafficking, gunrunning, and terrorism, the EU will not
survive. The people’s republics of Novorossiya will serve as a buffer for
Russia, however.
Europe cannot confront the United
States, but it is deathly afraid of a destroyed Ukraine. Therefore, for the
first time in the conflict, Hollande and Merkel are not just trying to sabotage
the U.S. demands (by imposing sanctions but not going too far), but they are
also undertaking limited independent action with the aim of achieving a
compromise – maybe not peace but at least a truce in the Ukraine.
If the Ukraine catches fire, it
will burn quickly, and if the EU has become an unreliable partner that is ready
if not to move into Russia’s camp then at least to take a neutral position,
Washington, faithful to its strategy, would be obliged to set fire to Europe.
It is clear that a series of
civil and interstate wars on a continent packed with all sorts of weapons,
where more than half a billion people live, is far worse than a civil war in
the Ukraine. The Atlantic separates the United States from Europe. Even Britain
could hope to sit it out across the Channel. But Russia and the EU share
a very long [sic] border.
It is not at all in Russia’s
interests to have a conflagration stretching from the Atlantic to the
Carpathian Mountains when the territory from the Carpathians to the Dnieper is
still smoldering. Therefore, Putin’s other objective is, to the extent
possible, to prevent the most negative effects of a conflagration in the
Ukraine and a conflagration in Europe. Because it is impossible to completely
prevent such an outcome (if the United States wants to ignite the fire, it
will), it is necessary to be able to extinguish it quickly to save what is most
valuable.
Thus, to protect Russia’s
legitimate interests, Putin considers peace to be of vital importance, because
it is peace that will make it possible to achieve this goal with maximum effect
at minimum cost. But because peace is no longer possible, and the truces are
becoming more theoretical and fragile, Putin needs the war to end as quickly as
possible.
But I do want to stress that if a
compromise could have been reached a year ago on the most favorable terms for
the West (Russia would have still obtained its goals, but later – a minor
concession), it is no longer possible, and the conditions are progressively
worsening. Ostensibly, the situation remains the same; peace on almost any
conditions is still beneficial for Russia. Only one thing has changed, but it
is of the utmost importance: public opinion. Russian society longs for victory
and retribution. As I pointed out above, Russian power is authoritative, rather
than authoritarian; therefore, public opinion matters in Russia, in contrast to
the “traditional democracies.”
Putin can maintain his role as
the linchpin of the system only as long as he has the support of the majority
of the population. If he loses this support, because no figures of his stature
have emerged from Russia’s political elite, the system will lose its stability.
But power can maintain its authority only as long as it successfully embodies
the wishes of the masses. Thus the defeat of Nazism in the Ukraine, even if it
is diplomatic, must be clear and indisputable – only under such conditions is a
Russian compromise possible.
Thus, regardless of Putin’s
wishes and Russia’s interests, given the overall balance of power, as well as
the protagonists’ priorities and capabilities, a war that should have ended
last year within the borders of the Ukraine will almost certainly spill over
into Europe. One can only guess who will be more effective – the Americans with
their gas can or the Russians with their fire extinguisher? But one thing is
absolutely clear: the peace initiatives of the Russian leaders will be limited
not by their wishes but their actual capabilities. It is futile to fight either
the wishes of the people or the course of history; but when they coincide, the
only thing a wise politician can do is to understand the wishes of the people
and the direction of the historical process and try to support it at all costs.
The circumstances described above
make it extremely unlikely that the proponents of an independent state of
Novorossiya will see their wishes fulfilled. Given the scale of the coming
conflagration, determining the fate of the Ukraine as a whole is not excessively
complicated but, at the same time, it will not come cheap.
It is only logical that the
Russian people should ask: if Russians, whom we rescued from the Nazis, live in
Novorossiya, why do they have to live in a separate state? If they want to live
in a separate state, why should Russia rebuild their cities and factories? To
these questions there is only one reasonable answer: Novorossiya should become
part of Russia (especially since it has enough fighters, although the governing
class is problematic). Well, if part of the Ukraine can join
Russia, why not all of it? Especially as in all likelihood by the time this
question is on the agenda, the European Union will no longer be an alternative
to the Eurasian Union [for the Ukraine].
Consequently, the decision to rejoin Russia
will be made by a united federated Ukraine and not by some entity without a
clear status. I think that it is premature to redraw the political map.
Most likely the conflict in the Ukraine will be concluded by the end of the
year. But if the United States manages to extend the conflict to the EU (and it
will try), the final resolution of territorial issues will take at least a
couple of years and maybe more.
In any situation we benefit from peace. In
conditions of peace, as Russia’s resource base grows, as new allies (former
partners of the United States) go over to its side, and as Washington becomes
progressively marginalized, territorial
restructuring will become far simpler and temporarily less significant,
especially for those being restructured.
Notes:
1 Moscow street where the
headquarters of the Presidential Administration of Russia is located.
3 Georgiy Gongadze was a Georgian-born
Ukrainian journalist and film director who was kidnapped and murdered in 2000.
4 The Cassette Scandal erupted in 2000
with the release of audiotapes on which Leonid Kuchma allegedly discussed the
need to silence Gongadze for reporting on high-level corruption.
5 As a result of the Cassette Scandal, a mass anti-Kuchma protest took place in the
Ukraine in 2000-2001.
